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Abstract
We analyze an environment plagued by double moral hazard where
the agent’s eﬀort level and the principal’s precision in monitoring are
not contractible. In such an environment, the principal tends to over-
monitor thereby inducing low eﬀort. To ease the latter problem, the
principal may choose to increase monitoring costs by outsourcing the
activity. As a result equilibrium monitoring is reduced and incentives
become more powerful. This choice is particularly likely when the
worker’s eﬀort is an important factor in determining output.
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1 Introduction
Outsourcing in the private and public sectors seems to be on the rise (Holm-
ström and Roberts 1998, Helpman 2006). Usually this trend is attributed to
cost-gains. We propose a new characterization of this organizational choice,
whereby a principal may choose to outsource an activity precisely because
the costs associated with this choice are higher. Under such circumstances
the outsourcing option may be used as a commitment device to increase
credibility. Specifically, it increases monitoring costs and provides powerful
incentives to govern the relationship between the principal and its agent.
Starting with Coase (1937) several key theories have been proposed to
explain the boundaries of firms. The transactions cost theory associated in
particular with Williamson focuses on the transaction as the basic explana-
tory unit (Williamson 1975, 1985). It suggests that transactions requiring
complex contracts tend to be the ones that justify a non-market governance
system. The property rights theory emphasizes the role of ownership of phys-
ical assets in an incomplete contracts environment (see Grossman and Hart
1986 and Hart and Moore 1990). Asset ownership provides bargaining power
influencing negotiations in case of unforeseen events. Hence, the ownership
structure influences expected returns and aﬀects choices of investment into
the relationship. According to this theory, the boundaries of the firm are
drawn in a way that maximizes the parties’ joint surplus. An alternative
explanation of the boundaries of the firm hinges on the importance of asset
ownership to align incentives in a multi-tasking environment (e.g. Holm-
ström, 1999 and the literature therein). In such an environment, ineﬃciency
arises because the agent’s reward is not correctly aligned with the principal’s
objective. Giving the agent control over assets may mitigate the problem if
the agent’s ensuing incentives better coincide with those of the principal.
The current paper also studies the boundary decision of the firm as emerg-
ing from incentive considerations, albeit with a diﬀerent mechanism based
on double moral hazard. The agent’s eﬀort is not contractible. Hence, in
order to induce eﬀort the principal designs an incentive contract requiring
the use of a proxy variable. The latter must be correlated with eﬀort and
is the outcome of monitoring. The precision of monitoring determines the
strength of the correlation between eﬀort and the proxy. Accordingly, the
principal may trade oﬀ precision and the power of the contract in compli-
ance with the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. Since in our setup
precision is costly, the principal would like to reduce monitoring and increase
power. However, precision is not contractible, resulting in double moral haz-
ard. Specifically, contracts with more power will induce the principal to
increase precision ex-post. Rational agents anticipate this implication and
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reduce eﬀort.1 We argue that under such circumstances the principal may
find it useful to adopt an organizational form that increases monitoring costs,
thereby increasing his own credibility.
We describe a setup in which integration is a priori informationally ad-
vantageous in monitoring. Nevertheless, we conclude that due to the afore-
mentioned moral hazard on the part of the principal, the easier it is to obtain
information within the organization, the more likely it becomes that the task
will not be carried out within its boundaries. Intuitively, we are applying
to the boundary of the firm a logic known since antiquity. Like Ulysses who
anticipated his attraction to the sirens and asked to be tied to the mast, the
principal in our environment anticipates his own future incentives to abuse
monitoring and thus selects an organizational design that makes it costly for
him to succumb to that temptation.
We assume that a decision to outsource an activity makes the collection
of eﬀort-related information more expensive by increasing both the level and
marginal costs of monitoring. As a result, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ be-
tween organizational costs (implying diﬀerent structures of monitoring costs)
and the agent’s induced performance. The extent of this trade-oﬀ depends
on the impact of eﬀort on the value created by the relationship relative to
the organizational costs, leading to a counter-intuitive result: ceteris paribus
the likelihood of outsourcing a task increases as the eﬀort associated with
that task becomes more valuable to the organization. In particular, this like-
lihood increases when the complementarity between the agent’s eﬀort and
the principal’s own productivity grows.
The adverse eﬀect of the potentially opportunistic behavior of a principal
lies at the center of the above argument. Such a possibility has long been
recognized by the literature in conjunction with incentive contracts. For in-
stance, one argument favoring tournament has been that it reduces gaming
by the principal through fixing the sum of wages (see Malcomson 1984). A
similar logic has been applied by Baiman and Rajan (1995) to contracts
where an employer agrees to pay into a bonus pool and thereby eliminates
any opportunistic action aimed at reducing bonus payments.2 The recent
financial crisis provides a number of real examples of such opportunistic be-
havior on the part of principals. For instance, in the dispute Commerzbank
AG vs. Keen the employer tried to find bona fide reasons for not paying
1This setup provides a non-behavioral explanation to the negative eﬀect of a principal’s
control on agents’ performance experimentally found by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). We are
grateful to a referee for pointing out this implication.
2Recently, Fisher et al (2005) carried out an experiment based on Baiman and Ra-
jan’s point where absent a precommitment on the total amout of boni to be allocated,
"employees’" performace fell short of that achieved under precommitment.
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a promised bonus (see Wynn-Evans 2007). The type of contractual incom-
pleteness illustrated above forms the base of our analysis.
Opportunistic behavior in monitoring is analyzed also by Strausz (1997)
who describes a double moral hazard problem where the principal cannot
commit to a monitoring precision. Strausz suggests a diﬀerent resolution
based on delegation to a supervisor which results in the introduction of
an additional contract. The latter provides a further instrument to re-
solve the double moral hazard. However, the possibility of collusion in
the Principal-Supervisor-Agent game generates additional diﬃculties. Vafai
(2005) finds conditions such that not delegating is preferable to the out-
come of the Principal-Supervisor-Agent organization. Another possibility to
deal with the principal’s opportunistic behavior emerges in a repeated game
framework. As is well known, this resolution works provided that the dis-
count factor and the likelihood of the game breaking down remain suﬃciently
small.
Our paper contributes to several strands of existing literature. First, it
is related to the Principal Agent literature which analyzes the implication of
a standard moral hazard problem. Like the existing trade-oﬀs between risk
and eﬃciency (e.g. Holmström 1979), and rent and eﬃciency (e.g. Innes
1990 and Sappington 1983), we find that the principal induces too little ef-
fort compared to the first-best. Obviously, this is related to the double moral
hazard literature (e.g. Al-Najjar 1997, Cooper and Ross 1985, Demski and
Sappington 1991, Agrawal 2002). With respect to this literature, our paper
is most closely related to Agrawal (2002) who also considers a tradeoﬀ involv-
ing monitoring costs. Specifically, it provides conditions which generate one
or the other type of incentive contracts. We extend the perspective of that
paper by including sourcing issues. Second, our analysis belongs to the grow-
ing literature that uses microeconomic foundations to explain organizational
choices (for a recent summary see Gibbons 2005). Third, our paper is related
to the recent contributions on the association between sourcing decisions and
firm productivity (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2004, and Antràs and Help-
man 2004). However, unlike our analysis, these papers which are based on
the property-rights theory conclude that the low productivity firms tend to
outsource, while the high productivity firms tend to integrate. Fourth, our
analysis is also linked to the accounting literature on the double moral haz-
ard problem. For example, Arya et al (1997) derive a set of conditions under
which an accounting system that provides less public information may be
desirable, as it raises the principal’s commitment capability.
Our main argument is most closely associated with models that introduce
credibility concerns to justify variations in the firm’s boundary. In particular,
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002, 2005) impose a credibility requirement
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on implicit contracts in the context of a repeated game structure in order to
derive the optimal organizational form. Even closer to our analysis, Kvaloy
(2007) argues that outsourcing may be useful in preventing opportunistic
behavior and enables the implementation of higher-powered incentives. In
contrast to these papers, we analyze the impact of credibility on the design
of explicit bonus contracts in a static framework without relying on repeated
game arguments. Our analysis is also related to Ichino and Muehlheusser
(2008) who consider the negative impact of too much monitoring in the con-
text of an adverse selection problem. Here too an increase in the principal’s
marginal costs of monitoring has an advantageous eﬀect.
Finally, our paper may be applied to the issue of outsourcing public ser-
vices. The existing literature seems to form a consensus that hard-to-control
and important tasks should not be outsourced (e.g. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny
1997, and Schmidt 1996). Similarly, Levin and Tadelis (2007) study outsourc-
ing decisions of municipalities in the U.S. In line with most of the literature,
they argue both theoretically and empirically, that harder to monitor ser-
vices, and those whose quality is important, are more likely to be provided
“in house”. Our model shows that when opportunistic behavior on the part
of the principal is likely, the second conclusion may be reversed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
presents the model. Section 3 contains the benchmark case with credible
monitoring. Section 4 analyzes the double moral hazard case and derives
implications for the organizational structure. Section 5 provides an exam-
ple. Section 6 presents supporting evidence. Finally, section 7 oﬀers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
A principal owns a production technology that requires the input of an agent.
Both parties are risk neutral and the agent’s opportunity costs are zero.
Moreover, the agent is not financially constrained. The value ( ) of this
relationship is increasing and concave in the agent’s eﬀort, , and increasing
in the technological productivity parameter  that characterizes the prin-
cipal. Moreover, eﬀort and productivity are complements. Eﬀort is costly
with a monetary cost-equivalent given by (), where 0()  0, 00()  0.
Output and eﬀort are not contractible, leading to a moral hazard problem
on the part of the agent. Furthermore, while the results obtained by the
monitoring technology used to align the agent’s incentives are contractible,
the principal’s monitoring intensity is not; hence, generating a double moral
hazard problem.
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2.1 Monitoring and Contracting
Kim (1997) proved that in principal-agent setups with risk-neutral parties,
verifiable information can be aggregated into a binary signal,  ∈ {0 1}.
Thus, in our framework the optimal incentive scheme will be a bonus con-
tract without any loss of generality. Let  denote the principal’s monitoring
intensity, and let
( ) = Pr[ = 1| ] (1)
be the probability of observing the aggregated signal that induces the bonus
payment.
Assumption: The monitoring technology is such that   0,   0 and
  0,   0.
The requirement   0makes sense in our context since we are interested
in cases where the principal may (ab)use information opportunistically to
reduce ex-post the likelihood of paying the bonus.3 The additional convexity
requirement means that this eﬀect weakens as monitoring intensity increases.
To clarify, consider the following example. The likelihood of mistakes an
agent may make in the course of his work decreases with eﬀort. Mistakes
can be detected by the principal depending on his monitoring intensity (for
instance, the fraction of time spent on observing the agent’s activity). In this
case the bonus will be paid if the principal detects fewer mistakes than some
critical level ( = 1). Holding the agent’s eﬀort constant while increasing the
monitoring intensity necessarily raises the likelihood of detecting mistakes,
thereby lowering the probability of paying the bonus.
The monitoring cost is a function ( ) where  is a shift parameter
with   0   0,   0 and   0. The shift parameter  stands
for factors that increase both level and marginal monitoring costs, such as
physical distance between the principal and the agent, complexity of the
monitored tasks or organizational boundaries. In particular, in the sequel
we associate integration (””) and outsourcing (””) with the parameters 
and , and assume that    .4
2.2 The timing of the game
Within the above environment, the parties make the following choices. The
principal decides on the organizational form, designs a contract and chooses
3Demougin and Fluet (2001) give a set of requirements on the underlying information
system such that   0. Intuitively, information systems should possess a non-crossing
property in eﬀort with respect to their informational content.
4For expository reasons, much of the analysis below is carried out taking  to be a
continuous variable.
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monitoring intensity. The agent decides whether to participate, and if he
does, howmuch eﬀort to exert. The sequence of events is as follows. First, the
principal decides whether to integrate or outsource. That choice then implies
a corresponding monitoring technology and cost. Second, the principal makes
a take-or-leave-it contract oﬀer to the agent. Third, the agent accepts or
rejects the oﬀer. Fourth, assuming the agent has accepted the contract, the
parties simultaneously make their respective choices,  and . Finally, the
monitoring process generates the aggregate signal and payments are made
according to the contract. The analysis follows the standard approach by
applying backward induction.
3 Credible monitoring
Before turning to the analysis of the double-moral-hazard problem, we ex-
amine the simple benchmark case where the principal can credibly commit
to a given monitoring intensity. In the above timing scheme, both the first
and the fourth stages are aﬀected. Specifically, in the first stage, the prin-
cipal not only decides on the organizational form, i.e. , but also chooses
the monitoring intensity . Consequently, in the fourth stage only the agent
selects eﬀort .
The emerging setup generates a standard moral hazard problem with
risk-neutral parties. At the contract design stage, the principal has already
chosen  and ; hence, the monitoring intensity is already given. In such an
environment the optimal contract specifies a fixed payment  and a bonus
 to be paid solely when  = 1. Such contract generates an expected com-
pensation  +( ) to an agent exerting eﬀort  subject to a monitoring
intensity .
Under these conditions, the principal can induce any eﬀort level (including
the first-best) by appropriately choosing , and then extract the ensuing rent
by adjusting  . Thus, the expected compensation associated with inducing
eﬀort  is simply (). Accordingly, the principal’s optimization problem at
stage 1 becomes:
max∈{} ( )− ()− ( ) (I)
Clearly, the principal will choose  and  so as to minimize the monitor-
ing cost ( ). Given our assumptions above, monitoring intensity  will
therefore be as small as possible. In addition, the principal will select the
organizational form that is associated with the lower monitoring and orga-
nization costs. As a consequence, with credible monitoring, the principal
chooses integration, i.e.  =  .
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4 The double-moral-hazard problem
We turn now to analyzing the original game, where the principal cannot
commit to the choice of the monitoring intensity at stage 1. Here too we
apply backward induction.
4.1 Eﬀort and monitoring choice
Starting at the fourth stage where the agent has accepted the contract {}
under the organizational structure , we determine the incentives of the two
parties. At this stage, the relationship is characterized by a Nash game.
Anticipating monitoring intensity, the agent chooses eﬀort, while the princi-
pal chooses monitoring intensity expecting the agent’s choice. Formally, the
agent and the principal simultaneously solve:
max  +( )−  () (2)
min  +( ) + ( ) (3)
From the point of view of the principal’s contract design problem, (2) rep-
resents the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint, while (3) captures the
principal’s credibility requirement. The (2) constraint is concave. Therefore,
the first order condition is suﬃcient. Analogously, the principal’s objective
(3) is convex, so that here too the first order condition is suﬃcient.
The resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by the two resulting first
order conditions:
(  )−  ¡¢ = 0 (4)
(  ) + (  ) = 0 (5)
Implicitly, the first-order conditions yield eﬀort and monitoring intensity
as functions of the bonus, ( ) and ( ). Accordingly, this stage of
the game generates a constraint on the "eﬀort-monitoring" pair which the
principal can implement. Notably, that pair depends on the organizational
structure through .
These first-order conditions are equivalent to an −  contour condition
C(  ) = 0 where
C(  ) ≡ ( )( ) +
()
( ) (6)
Assumption A1: C(  )  0 and C(  )  0 along the contour.
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Geometrically, 1 implies that along the contour, monitoring intensity
is implicitly an increasing function of the eﬀort, hereafter ∗( ).5 In the
Appendix, we verify that 1 is based on a simple economic intuition with
respect to the Nash equilibrium; it requires that the direct eﬀects of a vari-
ation of the bonus in the respective agent’s eﬀort choice and the principal’s
monitoring decision are dominant. Specifically, consider the second order
condition associated with (4). It implies that for a given , the level of eﬀort
is increasing in . Similarly, (5) implies that when holding eﬀort fixed, mon-
itoring intensity increases in . In equilibrium, these direct eﬀects may be
mitigated by feedback responses. In particular, with ( )  0, increased
monitoring intensity tends to reduce eﬀort in the worker’s decision problem.
The conditions in 1 are equivalent to requiring that the feedback eﬀects are
dominated by the direct impact of changes in the bonus.
4.2 Contracting
At the third stage, the agent decides whether to accept the contract. More-
over, the agent correctly anticipates the outcome of the subsequent Nash
game. Accordingly, given ( ) and ( ), the agent accepts the con-
tract if his participation condition is satisfied.
In the second stage, the principal correctly anticipates both subsequent
stages. Therefore, given any and , the principal adjusts the fixed payment
 to exactly meet the agent’s participation constraint.6 Taking this into
account, the principal’s objective simplifies to:
() = max (
( ) )− (( ))− (( ) ) (II)
The corresponding first-order condition is:
( − )  −  = 0 (7)
5One can observe here that the relation between eﬀort and monitoring intensity (strate-
gic complement or substitute) is complex. From the first order condition of the agent
(equation (4)), we can solve for the optimal reaction of eﬀort to changes in monitoring
intensity. Similarly, from the first order condition of the principal (equation (5)), we can
solve for the optimal reaction of monitoring intensity with respect to eﬀort. While these
go in opposite directions, the respective signs depend on the cross derivative of p with
respect to these vatriables. This cross derivative can take any sign.
6Given that the fixed payment enters negatively the principal’s profit, we know that
 will be chosen to make the agent just indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the
contract. Substituting  into the principal’s objective function yields the maximization
problem (II).
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From assumption 1, we know     0. Moreover, the marginal moni-
toring costs, , are also positive. Therefore, at the optimum we must have
 −   0. This yields the following result:
Proposition 1 The induced eﬀort is too low, relative to the first-best.
Notice that while under-investment in eﬀort is standard in moral-hazard
problems, the result here stems from a diﬀerent mechanism. Specifically, in
the existing literature ineﬃcient eﬀort may be due to one of the following
trade-oﬀs; risk vs. eﬃciency (e.g. Holmström 1979), rent vs. eﬃciency (e.g.
Sappington 1983), incentives vs. aligning tasks eﬃciently (e.g. Holmström
andMilgrom 1991), or equality vs. eﬃciency (e.g. Demougin, Fluet and Helm
2006). In our framework, none of these sources of ineﬃciency exists. Instead,
under-investment follows because the principal cannot credibly commit not
to over-monitor.
To see this, suppose the principal could pre-commit. Under these circum-
stances, the principal would find it optimal to reduce monitoring, thereby
lowering the informational content of the signal. To align incentives, the
principal would then oﬀer a larger bonus. However, absent commitment,
this is not credible. Therefore, in order to implement first-best eﬀort, the
principal would over-monitor. At the margin, it becomes useful to reduce ef-
fort, hence reducing the bonus as well as the principal’s incentive to monitor
excessively.
Our result can be related to findings in the behavioral literature on mon-
itoring. For instance, in an experiment Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that
closer control of the agent hurts motivation while Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008) provide a theoretical framework consistent with the findings. Our
model suggests a "non-behavioral" explanation of the negative relationship
between monitoring and eﬀort.
4.3 Organizational choice
The organizational choice made in the first stage clearly depends on the
impact of  on profit. In particular, if   0, then outsourcing is a dom-
inated option. On the other hand, when   0, the principal may decide
to outsource despite the higher organizational costs associated with this op-
tion. Given that a higher value of  implies higher monitoring and organiza-
tional costs, one would expect the former case to prevail. We show, however,
that the latter case may also occur and find conditions suﬃcient to generate
  0.
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Applying the envelope theorem to (II), we find:
 = ( − )  −  −  (8)









The expression in the square brackets captures the total eﬀect of a variation
in  on monitoring while taking the contour restriction into account. In
Appendix 2, we show that under 1 this expression is positive. Thus, the
entire first term on  of (9) is positive. It measures the indirect eﬀect
of a change in  on profit. In contrast, the second term captures the direct
impact of a change in  on the principal’s profit, which is clearly negative.
In the same Appendix, we reformulate  to derive the following result:
Proposition 2 Outsourcing dominates integration whenever

 +  −   1, (10)
where  denotes the elasticity of the function  with respect to the variables and .
Condition (10) considers a change in  that has been normalized to gener-
ate a unit change in the eﬀect of the direct cost. This is reflected by the 
of the inequality. In contrast, the  measures the associated indirect ef-
fect. Accordingly, if condition (10) holds, the indirect eﬀect dominates. In
the following section, we provide an example to demonstrate that the above
conditions may be met under circumstances that are not too strenuous.
Corollary 3 The marginal eﬀect of an increase in the principal’s productiv-
ity, i.e. , is larger under outsourcing.
Proof. Observe that  = ( )∗ where ∗ denotes the total eﬀect
of a variation in  on eﬀort. From the above argument, this eﬀect is posi-
tive.7 Thus, given the complementarity between the agent’s eﬀort and the
principal’s productivity, the result is obtained since    .
The corollary implies that outsourcing has a greater advantage for high
productivity firms. As noted above, under outsourcing the higher credibility
of the firm allows it to use more powerful contracts which leads to an increase
in eﬀort. Due to the complementarity, this eﬀect is more beneficial for high
productivity firms.
7The above argument is derived for the monitoring intensity  . However, monitoring
and eﬀort are positively related along the credibility constraint.
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4.4 Application to public services
Our setup can be applied to the provision of public services. In particu-
lar, it may help identify the circumstances under which a service should be
publically provided or outsourced. For instance, consider a case where the
high quality of a service is essential to avoid substantial damages (e.g. med-
ical services, water purification, air-traﬃc control etc.). For these cases, the
above setup needs to be slightly reinterpreted by setting ( ) = −( )
where  denotes the expected monetary value of damages and  the quality
of the public service.
Suppose that producing quality is plagued by a moral hazard problem
and that the public authority’s ability to pre-commit to a given level of
monitoring is limited. This may be due to ex-ante diﬃculties in contractually
describing monitoring in full. In addition, elected public oﬃcials may have
an incentive to over-monitor; for example, in order to temporarily reduce
deficits or demonstrate their concern for public welfare.8
Given this structure, the public authority’s objective is to minimize total
costs under the correct incentive and credibility constraints. This implies
that the requirement (6) must hold just as in the foregoing analysis. At
the stage of deciding the organizational structure, the public authority’s cost
minimization problem becomes
min ( ) + () + ( ) s.t. (6) (III)
Clearly, problem (III) is equivalent to the above maximization setup. In gen-
eral, the public authority’s sourcing decision depends on the interpretation of
. Below we provide a specific example concerning water provision in France
and interpret  as representing the importance of purification. We show that
purification tends to be outsourced when its quality becomes crucial.
5 An example
In this section, we specify ( ), ( ), and (). The functional form
describing the probability of obtaining the bonus builds on the example dis-
cussed in Section 2.1 and is directly taken from Demougin and Fluet (2001):
 ( ) =  (11)
Next, we specify a quadratic cost function associated with monitoring
8Moreover, reputational considerations may be weak and influenced by the voting cycle.
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and organizational structure:
( ) =  
2
2
+  +() with    0 (12)
This functional form satisfies the initial requirements on ( ); It is increas-
ing in  and , convex is , and has a positive cross derivative. Furthermore,
the function represents three types of costs. First, there is an interactive
element that makes both the level and the marginal cost of monitoring in-
crease as  increases. Second, there is a monitoring cost element that is
independent of . This captures the idea that some parts of the monitoring
technology are independent of the organizational form. Finally, there is an
organizational cost element that is independent of monitoring.
Turning to the eﬀort-cost function for the agent, we specify:
() = − ln(1− ) (13)
which is increasing and convex in . Under the above specification the con-
tour condition (6) yields:

 ln  +
(1− )−1
 +  = 0 (14)
As is easily verified, 1 is satisfied. Solving for  and keeping in mind that
only the positive root is relevant, yields:
 = − + (
2 − 4 (1− )−1 ln )12
2  (15)
Moreover, to obtain concavity of  with respect to , monitoring intensity,
, is restricted to be in the [0 1] interval. For that purpose and in order to
guarantee an interior solution, we choose the underlying parameters appro-
priately.
With () ≡ 0, we verify in Appendix 3 that the above specification
satisfies the conditions underlying proposition 2, making outsourcing the
dominating organizational form. However, reintroducing the organization
cost () may overturn this conclusion. Whether it does or not depends
predominantly on the principal’s productivity parameter  and its interaction
with the agent’s eﬀort. Specifically, when  and  are complements, an
increase in the principal’s productivity parameter implies that the agent’s
contribution to profit becomes more important. Consequently, one would
expect outsourcing to be more attractive since it raises credibility. In order
to demonstrate these eﬀects below, we specify the value generated by the
match between the principal and the agent to be
( ) = 212 (16)
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5.1 Numerical specification
In equation (12) we set  = 1, and examine two values for the  parameter;
 = 1 for the organizational structure with integration and  = 4 associated
with outsourcing. For the geometric representation, we let the productivity
factor  range between about 04 and 15. In line with the results stated
above, the eﬀort-choice curves are increasing in the productivity parameter
. Moreover, increasing the marginal cost of monitoring by raising  causes
the principal to induce higher eﬀort at every productivity level which reflects
the weakened moral hazard on the part of the principal. Monitoring also
increases in the productivity parameter, but a higher  reduces monitoring
intensity.
Internet Files/Content.Outlook/H4GTJR4K/graphics/fig01.gif
Figure 1: Productivity Costs and Sourcing
Figure 1 shows the positive impact of changes in  on profits. Note that
in the current example, the condition of proposition 2 holds. Hence, the
indirect eﬀect of  on profit dominates its direct eﬀect on cost. Specifically,
with () ≡ 0, profits are uniformly higher under outsourcing for all  and
the principal always prefers to outsource the activity. Observe in addition
that in accordance with the corollary, the slope of the profit curve with
respect to  is larger in the case of outsourcing. For this very reason the
introduction of organizational costs (in Figure 1, (4) = 04) causes the
resulting profit curve to cross the profit curve associated with integration
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( = 1) from below, at about  = 07. Therefore, for all values of  that are
smaller than 07 the principal chooses to integrate, whereas for larger values
of the productivity parameter, outsourcing becomes the dominant strategy.
6 Some Supporting Evidence
The following examples describe organizational choices that are hard to rec-
oncile with most of the existing literature on the sourcing decision. While
we do not claim that these observations provide conclusive "proof" corrob-
orating our model, we do argue that our model’s conclusions are consistent
with the evidence we present.
6.1 Japanese car makers
In their review paper, Holmström and Roberts (1998) provide numerous cases
of business relationships with disintegrated organizational structures that
appear puzzling from the point of view of existing theories. For example,
they point out that unlike American car makers, Toyota outsources design-
intensive tasks. Since the organizational form of the American car makers fits
well with standard predictions, Toyota’s decision to deviate from it requires
explanation. Holmström and Roberts suggest that in the Japanese system
“... the automakers are inherently too powerful and thus face too great a
temptation to misbehave opportunistically”. In that respect, they argue that
outsourcing “raises the cost of misbehavior” and thus increases credibility.
The model presented above follows a similar logic; outsourcing raises
the marginal monitoring costs and reduces the incentives of opportunistic
behavior in monitoring which increases the firm’s credibility. Moreover, the
firm will be willing to pay the high cost of outsourcing precisely when the
task involved is important.
6.2 Regulation
This example applies the same idea to the sphere of government regulations.
Gilardi (2005) claims that there is an increasing trend of governments to out-
source regulatory activities in broad spheres of economic undertakings; e.g.
utilities, financial markets, pharmaceuticals, food safety and environment.
Girardi argues that this trend may be due to “the need for governments to
increase their credible commitment capacity” which “lead(s) them to delegate
regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control.”
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Here again, the intuition is related to our analysis. Using the language
of our paper, by delegating regulation to an agency, a government raises its
cost of opportunistic behavior. In order to overturn a regulatory action, the
government would need to work through the independent regulatory agency
or, in an extreme case, abolish it. These are politically costly activities which
weaken the incentive to renege.
6.3 Water provision in France
This example considers the sourcing decision of a specific service, namely of
water purification in France, and enables us to match the model’s structure
with an actual sourcing problem. According to French law, municipalities
are responsible for supplying drinking water as well as the collection and
treatment of sewage. They are allowed to either delegate water management
services to a specialized private company or keep it under their direct con-
trol. However, independently of this sourcing decision, municipalities remain
responsible for water quality.
The final quality of drinking water depends on the initial condition of the
source water and the treatment process. For instance, underground water
is generally pure, requiring little treatment, whereas surface water tends to
be of poorer quality necessitating complex treatment and meticulous control.
Diﬀerent municipalities face diﬀerent types of water sources. Naturally, these
variations aﬀect the trade-oﬀs embedded in the principal-agent relationship.
Usual transaction cost arguments based on the complexity of contracts or the
importance of the task involved suggest that municipalities should outsource
simple cases while integrating the complex ones. In contrast, as stated in
4.4 our model predicts that as the importance of purification increases, out-
sourcing should become more likely.
The data we have contain 3606 French municipalities for which we know
whether water supply is operated by the municipality or outsourced.9 In
addition, we know for each of these municipalities to what extent the water
undergoes treatment. There are five levels of treatment, ranging from no
disinfection to heavy disinfection. We also know whether water originates
underground.
Figure 2 summarizes the data. As can be seen, a systematic bias in the
distribution of water quality according to the mode of operation of the water
9The data was collected by the INSEE. There are 29,000 contracts from which the ones
analyzed have been selected by the INSEE. The selection contains all municipalities with
more than 10,000 inhabitants and a random sample of the smaller municipalities. While
the data contain information on the type of the contract involved, unfortunately no further
details on the incentive structure are available.
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systems seems apparent. Whereas the high quality water source seems to
be more frequent among the publicly owned operators, the medium-light
and medium-heavy disinfection procedures are clearly more frequent among
the privately owned operators than in the population, and therefore these
categories are "under represented" among the publicly owned operators. This
is also true for easily treatable water, albeit less clearly. The same holds for
the underground water source, which is relatively easy to treat. The only
exception to this pattern occurs for the worst water quality, where the public
sector seems to have slightly more than the population share. However, it
should be noted that the latter diﬀerence is statistically insignificant.10
Internet Files/Content.Outlook/H4GTJR4K/graphics/Fig1.wmf
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Figure 2: Data Characteristics
Altogether the empirical evidence in this case is consistent with the pre-
dictions of our model. The tendency to outsource water purification in-
creases as the source becomes more contaminated. According to our model,
this makes purification more important (in terms of the responsibilities of
the public authority) which increases the need to obtain high-quality results.
Outsourcing enables municipalities to use high-powered contracts and obtain
the desired eﬀect.
10We have checked the impact of population size on the sourcing decision and found it
to be highly insignificant.
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7 Conclusion
This paper shows that when a principal cannot commit to a monitoring pol-
icy, he may benefit from increasing monitoring costs through outsourcing.
The paper argues that this conclusion is in line with some outsourcing deci-
sions of firms which otherwise appear puzzling. Specifically, one would expect
that higher monitoring costs associated with outsourcing would increase the
tendency to integrate. We show that this argument against outsourcing can
be turned on its head in the presence of double moral hazard. Deriving condi-
tions under which this occurs, the paper provides a novel trade-oﬀ to answer
Coase’s (1937) original question as to which transactions are more eﬃciently
conducted within a firm rather than through a market relationship. In par-
ticular, we conclude that outsourcing dominates when the agent’s eﬀort is
suﬃciently beneficial to the principal.
We have presented some evidence related to the sourcing decisions. The
sourcing patterns of French municipalities concerning water treatment appear
not to be in line with predictions found in the existing literature, but are con-
sistent with our theoretical framework. Furthermore, our conclusions may
also help explain other observed organizational choices that are puzzling from
the point of view of most alternative theories discussed by Holmström and
Roberts (1998). Their resolution of the contradictions is based on repeated
games arguments, while we suggest that credibility issues may generate the
observed phenomena even in a static framework. Finally, unlike other analy-
ses, the model generates a positive association between high-productivity
and the tendency to outsource. This positive association also seems to be
consistent with data (see, e.g. Olsen’s (2006) OECD survey).
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Appendix 1
Claim 4 A1 is equivalent to    0.







µ  +  −






Given that the determinant, det, is negative, we have:
sign() = sign [( + )  −] . (A1)
Suppose   0, then
 +  −  0 (A2)
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and substituting  from the principal’s first-order condition, (A2) becomes:
−  +  +   0 (A3)
Next, substituting  from the −  contour condition and multiplying the






()2  0 (A4)
Finally, note that the LHS of (A4) is C.
The equivalence between C  0 and   0 follows a similar argument.
Appendix 2
Claim 5  

 −   0
Proof. Consider the  −  contour along the Nash equilibrium path
C(( ) ( ) ) ≡ 0. Taking total derivatives with respect to  and
 yields
C + C = 0 (A5)
C + C + C = 0 (A6)






C  0 (A7)
Claim 6   0 iﬀ

 +  −   1.





µ  +  −







Using the implied results together  and  from Appendix 1 in (9), we find
 = 
∙ 




Using (5) to eliminate  and dividing by  yields
 =  −  + 
−  (A9)
which verifies the claim.
Appendix 3
Claim 7 The example defined by (11),(12) and (13) statisfies (10).
Proof. In order to verify that condition (13) holds, we compute the
relevant elasticities and substitute in (10). Hence, for all   0 we have:

 +  −  =
2( + )
2 +   1 (A10)
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